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EXXON V. FISCHER: THRESHER SHARKS PROTECT 
THE COASTAL ZONE 
Edward A. Fitzgerald* 
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 ("CZMA") is designed 
to establish a federal-state partnership to manage the coastal zone. 1 
It seeks to accomplish this by providing federal funding for the 
development and administration of state coastal zone management 
programs. 2 It also grants the coastal states some authority over 
federal and private activities which affect the coastal zone. 3 The 
CZMA provides the coastal states with the means to participate in 
the outer continental shelf ("OCS") development process. 4 
In recent years, executive and judicial action has threatened the 
federal-state partnership established by the CZMA. The Reagan 
administration attempted unsuccessfully to terminate the funding 
for the CZMA.5 The Supreme Court held that OCS lease sales are 
* B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Wright State University. The author wishes 
to express his thanks to Tim Eichenberg for his valuable comments. 
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The coastal zone extends "seaward to 
, the outer limit of the United States territorial sea ... [and] inland from the shorelines only 
to the extent necessary to control shorelands .... " Id. § 1453(1). 
2Id. §§ 1454-1455. 
:l Id. § 1456. 
4Id. §§ 1456-1456a. 
Title 43, Public Lands, defines OCS as "all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of 
the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in Section 1301 of this title, and of 
which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction 
and control." 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982). Section 1301 of Title 43 defines lands beneath 
navigable water as " ... all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to 
but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles distant 
from the coast line of each such State .... " 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1982). 
It has been estimated that as much as "60% of the Nation's undiscovered oil and gas 
resources" are contained in the OCS. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS DEVELOP-
MENT 1 (Report to the Congress of the United States, 1981). 
5 Fitzgerald, Outer Continental Shelf Revenue Sharing: A Proposal to End the Seaweed 
Rebellion, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 1, 18-21 (1985). 
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not subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1) of the 
CZMA because they do not directly affect the coastal zone. 6 
The Exxon corporation in Exxon Corp. v. Fischer7 challenged 
state consistency authority under section 307(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA. 
According to the California district court, section 307(c)(3)(B) of the 
CZMA requires an applicant for an OCS exploration, development 
and plans to certify that the plan is consistent with the coastal zone 
management program of any affected coastal state. 9 The certification 
is submitted to the coastal state which can consent or object to the 
certification. 10 An unsuccessful applicant may appeal to the Secretary 
of Commerce (the "Secretary") who may override the state's objec-
tion on the grounds that the activity is consistent with the CZMA 
or in the interest of national security. 11 
6 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 320-43 (1984). See also Fitzgerald, 
Secretary of Interior v. California: Should Continental Shelf Lease Sales Be Subject to 
Consistency Review?, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 425 (1985). 
7 No. 84-2362 (D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1985), rev'd, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1986). 
8 Exploration, which takes approximately 60-90 days, involves the use of mobile rigs to 
explore for commercial quantities of oil and gas. The potential impacts from such activity 
include the discharge of drill muds and cuttings, interference with fishing activities, emission 
of air pollutants, impediments to navigation, and accidental oil spills. Development and pro-
duction entails the establishment of offshore drilling platforms from which production wells 
can be located. The oil and gas recovered is then shipped by tanker or pipeline to refining 
facilities. Eichenberg, The Thresher Shark Case: Another Challenge to State Coastal Man-
agement Authority, 6 TERRITORIAL SEA 1, 2 n.8 (1986). 
9 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 2. 
10 Id. at 2-3. 
II CZMA of 1972 § 307, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) states 
After final approval by the Secretary of a state's management program, any 
applicant for a required Federal license or permit to conduct an activity affecting 
land or water uses in the coastal zone of that state shall provide in the application to 
the licensing or permitting agency a certification that the proposed activity complies 
with the state's approved program and that such activity will be conducted in a 
manner consistent with the program. At the same time, the applicant shall furnish 
to the state or its designated agency a copy of the certification, with all necessary 
information and data. Each coastal state shall establish procedures for public notice 
in the case of all such certification and, to the extent it deems appropriate, procedures 
for public hearings in connection therewith. At the earliest practicable time, the state 
or its designated agency shall notify the Federal agency concerned that the state 
concurs with or objects to the applicant's certification. If the state or its designated 
agency fails to furnish the required notification within six months after receipt of its 
copy of the applicant's certification, the state's concurrence with the certification shall 
be conclusively presumed. No license or permit shall be granted by the Federal 
agency until the state or its designated agency has concurred with the applicant's 
certification or until, by the state's failure to act, the concurrence is conclusively 
presumed, unless the Secretary, on his own initiative or upon appeal by the applicant, 
finds after providing a reasonable opportunity for detailed comments from the Federal 
agency involved and from the state, that the activity is consistent with the objectives 
of this chapter or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security. 
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In Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, the courts had to answer two questions 
pertaining to section 307(c)(3)(B): first, whether the socioeconomic 
impacts on California's coastal fishing industry resulting from 
Exxon's OCS exploration activities constituted an effect on land and 
water uses in the coastal zone? Second, what was the scope of the 
Secretary's authority in reviewing the appeal of California's objec-
tion?12 
The federal district court held that socioeconomic impacts on Cal-
ifornia's coastal fishing industry resulting from Exxon's OCS explo-
ration activities could not support California's objection. 13 Since the 
Secretary could not address this issue, an appeal to the Secretary 
was unnecessary prior to a judicial challenge. 14 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court on the grounds that 
Exxon could not relitigate in a collateral proceeding having already 
litigated the issue before the Secretary.15 The Ninth Circuit Court, 
however, did not address expressly the central issues in the case. 16 
This Article demonstrates that socioeconomic impacts on the 
coastal fishing industry resulting from OCS exploration constitute 
effects on land and water uses in the coastal zone that are subject 
to state consistency review. Furthermore, if a coastal state objects 
to a consistency certification, in most cases, the unsuccessful appli-
cant must appeal to the Secretary before challenging the state's 
objection in court. 
I. SEAWEED REBELLION 
In order to understand the significance of Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 
it is necessary to review the history of federal-state relations re-
garding OCS development. OCS development has generated much 
conflict between the federal and state governments. This conflict, 
known as the Seaweed Rebellion, has occurred both in the courts 
and in Congress. 17 
"The Tidelands Controversy," which began before World War II, 
was the first major conflict precipitated by offshore petroleum de-
velopment. 18 This conflict dealt with whether the federal or state 
12 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362. 
13Id. 
14Id. 
15 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 1987). 
16Id. 
17 See generally Fitzgerald, supra notes 5-6 and infra notes 48, 68. 
18 For an extensive discussion of the tidelands controversy see H. MARSHALL, THE FED-
ERAL-STATE STRUGGLE FOR OFFSHORE OIL (1966). 
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governments held title to offshore coastal lands. 19 In several cases, 
the Supreme Court declared that the federal government owned 
offshore coastal lands. 20 In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged 
Lands Act ("SLA") which granted the states title to the land three 
miles seaward of their coasts. 21 The SLA overturned the Supreme 
Court's decisions and enabled the coastal states to regulate and 
derive the benefits from offshore petroleum development. 
One month after the enactment of the SLA, Congress passed the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA").22 The OCSLA 
granted the federal government jurisdiction over OCS lands beyond 
the three mile limit established in the SLA.23 The SLA delegated 
broad discretionary authority to the Secretary of the Interior to 
regulate OCS development. 24 By constructing the statute in general 
terms, Congress intended to create a flexible OCS development 
process that could adapt to changing conditions. 25 
There was little public scrutiny of OCS operations from 1953 to 
1969. Offshore development was limited. The technology for oil and 
gas development in the deeper OCS waters was still in its infancy. 
Nevertheless, by the late 1960's new public concerns, such as envi-
ronmental protection and coastal management, began to emerge. 26 
The Santa Barbara oil spill legitimized the concerns of environmental 
groups and focused national attention on the dangers of offshore 
petroleum development.27 Congress responded by enacting new stat-
utes which would affect OCS development: the National Environ-
mental Policy Act,28 the Marine Sanctuaries Act,29 the Endangered 
Species Act,30 and the Coastal Zone Management Act. 31 
19Id. 
20 E.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 
U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). 
21 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982). 
22 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also Christopher, The 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1953). 
23 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). 
24 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982). The OCSLA has since been described as "essentially a carte 
blanche delegation of authority to the Secretary of Interior." H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 54 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 590]. 
25 Coulter, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act-Its Adequacies and Limitations, 4 
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 725, 726 (1971). 
26 Bowman, The Environmental Movement: An Assessment of Ecology Politics, 5 ENVTL. 
AFF. 649, 650 (1976). 
27 Jones, Understanding the Offshore Oil and Gas Controversy, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 221, 243 
n.94 (1982). 
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335 (1982). 
29 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1433 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
30 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). 
31 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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At the same time Congress was instructing federal agencies to 
consider environmental factors in their decision-making process, 
there was a growing recognition of a domestic energy shortage. 32 In 
1971, President Nixon decided to pursue an extensive OCS leasing 
program. 33 For the first time OCS leasing was scheduled to occur in 
the undeveloped frontier areas. 34 President Nixon expanded the pro-
gram's goals in 1973,35 and they were expanded again in 1974 follow-
ing the Arab oil boycott. 36 
Many coastal states, coastal communities, and environmental and 
fishing industry groups opposed the expanded OCS leasing program. 
These groups resorted to the courts to halt particular lease sales. 37 
The courts were called upon to interpret the new statutory man-
dates. Meanwhile, Congress sought to reduce state opposition and 
to expedite OCS development by enacting amendments to the 
CZMA38 and to the OCSLA.39 
Congress enacted the CZMA amendments to deal with the impacts 
of OCS development on the coastal zone. Congress established the 
Coastal Energy Impact Program ("CEIP") which provided funds to 
coastal states and communities to mitigate the adverse impacts of 
OCS development. 4o Furthermore, Congress added a new section to 
the consistency provisions that granted the coastal states the right 
to determine if a federal lessee's exploration, development and pro-
duction plans were consistent with the states' coastal zone manage-
ment programs. 41 
In 1978, after a difficult four year struggle, Congress enacted 
amendments to the OCSLA.42 The OCSLA Amendments divided the 
32 Special Message to the Congress on Energy Resources, 195 PUB. PAPERS 703 (June 4, 
1971). 
33 I d. at 709. 
34 Frontier areas had not yet experienced OCS development. They are further defined in 
H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 24, at 126-27. 
35 Address to the Nation About Policies To Deal With the Energy Shortages, 323 PUB. 
PAPERS 916 (Nov. 7, 1973). 
36 Special Message to the Congress on the Energy Crisis, 17 PUB. PAPERS 29 (Jan. 23, 
1974). 
37 E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); National Resource Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); California v. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26 
(C.D. Cal. 1975). 
38 Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
39 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 
629 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866 (1982». 
40 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1982). 
41 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982). 
42 Murphy and Belsky, oes Development: A New Law aud a New Beginning, 7 COASTAL 
ZONE MGMT. J. 297 (1980). 
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OCS development process into four distinct states: 1) the preparation 
of a five year leasing schedule;43 2) the lease sale;44 3) exploration;45 
and 4) development and production. 46 The Amendments required the 
Secretary of the Interior to follow delineated procedures at each 
stage of the process.47 Congress recognized the need to expedite 
OCS development, but in an environmentally conscious manner that 
reflected state and local government concerns. 
Federal-state conflicts continued after the enactment of the OC-
SLA Amendments. Two of the most controversial battles of the 
Seaweed Rebellion involved the establishment of Interior's five year 
OCS leasing program under section 18 of the OCSLA 48 and the 
consistency review of OCS lease sales under section 307(c)(1) of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act.49 
While this litigation was underway, President Reagan came to 
office seeking to reduce the federal deficit. To help accomplish this, 
Reagan decided to accelerate and expand OCS leasing, while at-
tempting to terminate the funding for many ocean and coastal pro-
grams. 50 
The Reagan administration targeted the programs established un-
der the CZMA for elimination. 51 The administration asserted that 
the CZMA had achieved its goals and the states, being aware of the 
benefits of sound coastal zone management, would continue to fund 
their programs. 52 Furthermore, the Reagan administration slated 
the Coastal Energy Impact Program for termination because the 
anticipated boomlbust cycle associated with OCS development had 
not occurred. 53 
The Reagan administration also proposed to eliminate the funding 
for the following programs: 1) the National Sea Grant, which Con-
gress enacted in 1966 to develop a network of universities dedicated 
43 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982) (five year program). 
44 I d. § 1345. 
451d. § 1340. 
461d. § 1351. 
47 Id. §§ 1340, 1344, 1345, 1351. 
48 Fitzgerald, California v. Watt: Congressional Intent Bows to Judicial Restraint, 11 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 147 (1987). 
49 See Fitzgerald, supra note 6. 
50 President's Message to the Congress Transmitting the Proposed Package on the Program 
for Economic Recovery, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 115 (February 18, 1981); Proposed 5-Year OCS 
Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981). 
51 Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 18. 
52 Id. at 18-19. 
53 Id. at 19. 
1987] EXXON V. FISCHER 567 
to marine education and research;54 2) the Commercial Fisheries 
Research and Development Act, which Congress established in 1964 
to provide grants for research and the development of commercial 
fisheries;55 and 3) the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, which 
Congress enacted in 1965 to conserve, develop, and enhance the 
nation's anadromous fishery resources. 56 The administration con-
tended that the goals of the programs had been realized and that 
state and private industry, as the beneficiaries, should fund their 
own programs. 57 
The Reagan administration engendered much hostility from 
coastal states by pursuing an aggressive OCS leasing program while 
attempting to terminate the funding for vital ocean and coastal pro-
grams. 58 In order to maintain the funding of these ocean and coastal 
programs and to minimize coastal state opposition to OCS leasing, 
Congress considered various bills that would provide for the sharing 
ofOCS revenues with the coastal states. 59 After a five year struggle, 
in the face of intense Reagan administration opposition, Congress 
rejected OCS revenue sharing in 1986.60 Nevertheless, Congress 
reauthorized the CZMA,61 maintained the funding for the aforemen-
tioned programs,62 and established moratoria on OCS leasing in cer-
tain environmentally sensitive areas. 63 
While Congress debated OCS revenue sharing, another OCS rev-
enue sharing battle was underway in the courts. Texas and the 
Department of the Interior disagreed over what constituted a "fair 
and equitable" disposition of revenues derived from common pools 
under section 8(g) of the OCSLA.64 A federal district court deter-
mined that the "fair and equitable" standard should be interpreted 
broadly to include recovery for bonus enhancement65 and a share of 
the revenues generated from all section 8(g) leasing. 66 
54 33 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1131 (1982). 
55 16 U.S.C. §§ 779-779f (1982). 
56 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757g (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
57 Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 20. 
56 Id. at 21. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 21-29. 
61 Comprehensive Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 124 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1451). 
62 Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 21, 46-47. 
63 Id. at 11-13. 
64 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982). 
65 Bonus enhancement refers to the amount" by which bids for OCS tracts are increased as 
a result of prior state offshore leasing. 
66 Texas V. Secretary of the Interior, 580 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Tex. 1984). 
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, 
Congress decided that a legislative solution to this issue was re-
quired. Congress amended section 8(g) to allow coastal states to 
share in all of the revenues derived from leasing in the 8(g) zone,67 
not just those generated from common pools. These funds will allow 
the coastal states to deal with the adverse economic and environ-
mental impacts resulting from OCS development. 68 
Exxon Corp. v. Fischer was another battle in the Seaweed Re-
bellion that focused on OCS development and the consistency pro-
visions of the CZMA~ 69 In an earlier battle, the Supreme Court held 
that OCS lease salek did not directly affect the coastal zone, and 
thus were not subject to federal consistency review under section 
307(c)(1).70 In Exxon Corp. v. Fisher, the scope of coastal state 
authority under section 307(c)(3)(B) was contested. 71 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
In early 1983, Exxon, as the designated operator of a quadrant in 
the Santa Barbara Channel, submitted an exploration plan and en-
vironmental report to the Department of Interior's Minerals Man-
agement Service, seeking approval for three exploratory wells (A, 
B, C).72 Several days later, Exxon gave similar information and a 
certification of consistency to the California Coastal Commission as 
required under the CZMA.73 
In July 1983, the Commission objected to Exxon's consistency 
certification.74 The Commission asserted that Exxon's plan failed to 
comply with the enforceable policy requirements of the California 
Coastal Act which provides for the protection of marine resources 
and commercial fishing activities in the coastal zone. 75 Specifically, 
67 The 8(g) zone is the area extending 3 miles seaward from state coastal zones. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(g) (1982). 
68 Act of April 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 
Stat.) 148. For a detailed review of this battle see Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: The 
Battle Over Section 8(g) Revenues (to be published in the Journal of Energy Law and Policy). 
69 No. 84-2362 (D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1985), rev'd, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1986). 
70 Secretary of the Interior V. California, 464 U.S. 312, 658 (1984). 
71 No. 84-2362. 
72 [d. at 5-6. 
73 [d. at 6. 
74 [d. 
75 [d. at 7-8. Sections 30001(c), 30230, 30231, 30234, 30250, 30255, 30260 and 30703 of the 
California Public Resources Code require the Commission to protect both the commercial 
fishing industry, and the land associated with it, from the reasonably mitigable individual and 
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Exxon's exploration activities would interfere with thresher shark 
fishing, if exploration occurred during the fishing season from May 
to December. 76 
In response to Exxon's appeal, the Secretary conducted negotia-
tions that led to an agreement between the parties. 77 The Commis-
sion approved the drilling of well A which Exxon would complete 
before the thresher shark fishing season began on May 1.78 The 
Commission also agreed to reconsider Exxon's exploration plans for 
wells Band C.79 
In February 1984, the Commission again objected to Exxon's 
consistency certification for wells Band C.80 This precluded any 
federal agency from issuing any permits for development.81 Again, 
Exxon appealed to the Secretary who could override the state's 
objection if he found that the activity was consistent with the CZMA 
or in the interest of national security. 82 
B. Secretary of Commerce's Decision 
Department of Commerce regulations required the Secretary to 
consider four factors in determining if an activity was consistent 
with the objectives of the CZMA.83 First, the Secretary had to 
determine if the activity furthered the national objectives or pur-
poses set out in the CZMA.84 Since OCS development was within 
the purposes of the CZMA, this requirement was satisfied. 85 
cumqlative effects of any oil and gas developments which adversely affect them or threaten 
to displace them from the portions of the California coast they now occupy. Cal. Pub. Res. 
Code §§ 30001(c), 30230, 30231, 30234, 30250, 30255, 30260 and 30703 (West 1986). 
76 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 7. Fishermen complained that drilling would 
interfere with the harvesting of the thresher sharks. The fishermen utilize a fishing technique 
known as drift gill netting which requires the fishermen to drift with the current pulling nets 
as long as 6000 feet. While fishing, the ships are not under power. They can not, therefore, 
maneuver and are vulnerable to drilling rigs and their anchoring systems. Moreover, the 
thresher shark fishing season is limited to May through December. Drift gill netting is 
prohibited during the other months because it would endanger whale migration. Id. 
77 See id. at 8. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80 Id. at 8-10. 
81Id. 
82Id. at 10-11. 
83 15 C.F.R. § 930.121 (1987). 
84 15 C.F. R. § 930.121(a) (1987). 
85 Decision and Findings of the Secretary of Commerce in the Consistency Appeal of Exxon 
Company, U.S.A. to an Objection from the California Coastal Commission 6 (Nov. 14, 1984) 
[hereinafter Secretary's Findings]. 
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Second, the Secretary had to determine if the activity's impact on 
the natural resources of the coastal zone was less than the activity's 
contribution to the national interest. 86 The Commission asserted that 
since Exxon's exploration would harm the thresher shark fishery, 
the commercial coastal fishing industry would suffer.87 This would 
violate the California Coastal Act which requires the protection and 
upgrading of commercial fishing facilities such as hoists, ice houses, 
processing plants, and pier uses.88 
Exxon argued that the effects on the thresher shark fishery were 
commercial, thus did not affect land and water uses in the coastal 
zone.89 According to Exxon, the protection of OCS fishing activities 
from conflicts with other OCS users did not constitute the proper 
basis for a consistency objection because it was only a perceived 
economic impact. 9o Furthermore, the Secretary of the Interior was 
to resolve OCS conflicts, not the Secretary of Commerce. 91 
The Secretary determined that, although Exxon's activity affected 
the land and water uses of the coastal zone, such impacts were not 
substantial. 92 The impacts were outweighed by the national interest 
in the projected 35 million barrels of oil and 272 billion cubic feet of 
gas. 93 
Third, the Secretary, as required,94 determined that Exxon's ex-
ploration plan did not violate the Clean Air Act95 or the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. 96 
Finally, the Secretary had to find that no reasonable alternatives 
were available. 97 This required the Secretary to balance the costs 
and benefits of various alternatives. 98 The Secretary found that, even 
though the economic impacts on the coastal zone were limited, all 
adverse impacts could be avoided if drilling was restricted to the off-
season. 99 The Secretary also determined that the record did not 
support Exxon's contention that they would incur exorbitant costs 
86 15 C.F.R. § 930.121(b) (1987). 
87 Secretary's Findings, supra note 85, at 8-11. 
88 Id. 
89Id. 
90 Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
93 Id. at 8-11. 
94 See 15 C.F.R. § 930. 121(c) (1987); Secretary's Findings, supra note 85, at 12-13. 
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1982). 
96 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1982). 
97 Secretary's Findings, supra note 85, at 13-15. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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from restricted drilling. lOo Evidence showed that Exxon drilled well 
A in January and February and neither California nor the fishing 
industry raised objections. 101 Since the thresher shark fishing season 
was about to end, Exxon could comply with the drilling restrictions 
easily.102 Other companies, such as Sun Oil, Chevron, Getty, and 
Arco, have accommodated such restrictions, demonstrating that the 
restrictions were not unreasonable. 103 Consequently, Exxon did not 
show that its exploration activities were consistent with the purposes 
of the CZMA.104 
The Secretary could also override the state's objection in the 
interest of national security.105 Exxon argued that OCS drilling 
would further national security because the increased production of 
oil and gas would reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil.106 The 
Secretary, disagreeing with Exxon, determined that the small 
amount of oil and gas, if present, would not have a significant impact 
on national security.107 Furthermore, the decision did not prohibit 
all drilling, only that occurring during the thresher shark fishing 
season. lOS Consequently, Exxon's argument did not warrant a sec-
retarial override on national security grounds. 109 
C. Federal District Court Decision 
Prior to the Secretary's decision, Exxon filed suit challenging the 
Commission's objection. l1O The court, however, did not decide the 
case until after the Secretary rendered his decision. 
The court, examining the procedural issues, held that prudential 
considerations, such as the appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and 
the possible interference with federal-state affairs, would not pro-
hibit judicial review. 111 The federal court had jurisdiction because 
the California coastal management program was federal law for the 
purposes of consistency review. 112 Furthermore, since the Secretary 
100 Id. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See 15 C.F.R. § 930.122 (1987). 
106 Secretary's Findings, supra note 85, at 15-16. 
107Id. 
lOB Id. 
109Id. at 17. 
110 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362. 
III Id. at 18-19. 
112Id. at 19. 
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in his override consideration must assume the correctness of the 
state's decision, the court's failure to examine the scope of the Com-
mission's authority would grant the Commission a veto to which it 
was not entitled under the statute. 113 
The court found that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies was inapplicable. 114 Exxon could challenge the Secretary's 
decision, but this was not required. 115 If the court was to review the 
Secretary's decision, it would have to determine if the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. 116 None of these was crucial to the case. This 
case presented a purely legal question, whether the Commission was 
acting within the scope of its statutory authority. Once the Commis-
sion made its decision, judicial review could occur. 117 
The court determined that the Secretary's decision did not have 
preclusive effect under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. 118 The Secretary was not acting in a judicial capacity, nor 
did he address the issues before the court. 119 The Secretary did not 
consider whether the Commission acted within the scope of its au-
thority, the statutory language, or the legislative history of the 
CZMA.120 Consequently, the Secretary's decision did not constitute 
an adjudication of the legal issues in the case. 121 
Turning to the substantive issues presented, the court held that 
coastal state authority was limited to activities that occurred in the 
coastal zone. 122 Since thresher shark fishing occurred on the OCS, 
the state had no authority over such activity.l23 If the state was 
allowed to extend its authority beyond the coastal zone, its authority 
would intrude on federal lands. 124 In addition, the court held that an 
exercise of such authority would be contrary to the Supreme Court's 
decision limiting state authority to the geographical confines of the 
coastal zone. 125 
113 [d. 
114 [d. at 20-24. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. at 21, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
117 See id. at 20-24. 
118 [d. at 26-28. 
119 [d. 
120 [d. 
121 [d. at 26-29. 
122 [d. at 31-37. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. 
125 [d. 
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The court emphasized that affected land uses under section 
307(c)(3)(B) must occur in or on the shorelands of the coastal zone 
and emphasized only conventional notions of land use planning, such 
as inventory of lands of particular interest or guidelines on the 
priority uses of certain facilities. 126 Nothing in the statute suggests 
that the coastal state could utilize consistency authority to protect 
the economic interests of a particular industry. Furthermore, the 
Coastal Energy Impact Program, which provided funds to the 
coastal states to plan for the economic effects of OCS development 
and for infrastructure development,127 did not expand the scope of 
state consistency authority. 128 
D. Ninth Circuit Court's Decision 
The Ninth Circuit Court disagreed with the district court's ap-
praisal of the Secretary's decision. The circuit court raised three 
questions in its evaluation of the Secretary's decision: 1) did the 
Secretary act in a judicial capacity?; 2) were the issues presented to 
the district court litigated before the Secretary?; and 3) was the 
resolution of the issues critical to the Secretary's decision?129 
First, the court determined that the Secretary acted in a judicial 
capacity. Even though the Secretary acted as policymaker, balancing 
costs and benefits and soliciting comments from nonparties, Exxon 
received a full hearing with the opportunity to present and rebut 
evidence. 130 Exxon took this opportunity to introduce thresher shark 
statistics in the area, which the Secretary utilized in his final deci-
sion. 131 Furthermore, the question the Secretary decided was a legal 
issue, not a policy determination. 132 
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the parties had litigated the 
central issue of the case before the Secretary. 133 The Secretary found 
that Exxon's activities affected land and water uses in the coastal 
zone. 134 Although these effects were insignificant, Exxon neverthe-
less could avoid all adverse impacts if its exploration was limited to 
126Id. 
127 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a)(I) (1982). 
12" Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 46-18. 
129 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842, 845-66 (9th Cir. 1986). 
130Id. at 846. 
131Id. 
132Id. 
133 Id. 
134Id. 
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the drilling window. 135 This determination necessitated a finding that 
the Commission's objection was valid under the CZMA and that the 
interests asserted were protected under the statute. Otherwise, 
there was nothing to which the Secretary could have legitimately 
subordinated Exxon's interests. 136 
Finally, the circuit court did not decide if Exxon was required to 
submit its objection to the Secretary before challenging the Com-
mission's objection in the court.137 The court held that since Exxon 
had litigated the issue before the Secretary, Exxon could not reliti-
gate the issue in a collateral proceeding. 138 Exxon's proper recourse 
was to challenge the Secretary's decision. 139 
III. ISSUE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS 
The first issue that the courts had to address was whether the 
socioeconomic impacts on the coastal zone resulting from OCS ex-
ploration constituted an effect on land and water uses in the coastal 
zone that was subject to state consistency review under section 
307(c)(3)(B). An examination of the statute's legislative history, Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulations, 
Coastal Energy Impact Program, and several court cases indicate 
that the answer to this question is "yes." 
A. Legislative History 
Congress recognized that the coastal zone possesses a "variety of 
natural, commercial, recreational, ecological, industrial, and es-
thetic resources of immediate and potential value to the present and 
future well-being of our Nation."14o Increasing and competing de-
mands, "occasioned by population growth and economic develop-
ment," were damaging the coastal zone. 141 Consequently, Congress 
had to develop an institutional structure to manage the demands on 
the coastal zone. 
Congress decided that the key to effective coastal zone manage-
ment was to encourage the coastal states to exercise their regulatory 
135 ld. 
1361d. 
137 I d. at 846. 
138 ld. at 846-47. 
1391d. at 847. 
140 16 U.S.C. § 1451(b) (1982) [emphasis added]. 
141 ld. § 1451(c) [emphasis added]. 
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authority over the coastal zone. 142 Coastal states were urged to 
develop coastal zone management programs which balanced eco-
nomic development and the protection of natural resources. 143 A 
coastal zone management program had to consider "ecological, cul-
tural, historic, and esthetic values," as well as the needs for economic 
development. 144 
To accomplish this goal, Congress provided the funds for the de-
velopment and implementation of state programs. 145 As a further 
incentive, federal and private actions that affected the coastal zone 
had to be consistent with state programs.146 A review of the legis-
lative history of the consistency provisions of the CZMA, particularly 
the relationship between sections 307(c)(1) and (c)(3)(B), demon-
strates that Congress intended the socioeconomic effects on land and 
water uses in the coastal zone resulting from OCS exploration to be 
subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(3)(B). 
1. 1971 
A Senate bill, considered in 1971, contained the first consistency 
provisions. 147 Section 313(b) of the bill stated that, "all Federal agen-
cies conducting or supporting activities in the coastal zone ... shall 
administer their programs consistent with approved State manage-
ment programs. "148 The Senate report explaining this section stated 
that, 
any lands and waters under Federal jurisdiction and control, 
within or adjacent to the coastal or estuarine zone, where the 
administering Federal agency determines them to have a func-
tional interrelationship from an economic, social, or geographic 
standpoint with the lands and waters within the coastal zone and 
estuarine zone, should be administered consistent with approved 
state management programs. 149 
Section 313(c) provided that "applicants for federal licenses and/ 
or permits to conduct any new activity affecting land and water uses 
in the coastal zone" required state certification before the granting 
142 [d. § 1451(i). 
143 See id. § 1452(2). 
144 [d. 
145 [d. §§ 1454(a), 1455(a) [emphasis added]. 
146 [d. § 1456(c). 
147 S. 582, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
148 [d. 
149 S. Rep. No. 526, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1971). 
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of the license or permit.150 The Secretary of Commerce could over-
ride the state's decision if the federal activity was consistent with 
the purposes of the Act or necessary for national security.151 State 
review was limited to Federal licenses and permits occurring in the 
coastal zone. 152 The functional interrelationship test applied to sec-
tion 313(b), not to section 313(c).153 
2. 1972 
The Senate renewed its consideration of the CZMA in 1972. The 
consistency language in the Senate bill pertaining to federally sup-
ported or conducted activity in the coastal zone remained the same. 154 
Consequently, the Senate continued to apply the functional interre-
lationship test to federal activities on the OCS. 
The language pertaining to state consistency review of federally 
issued licenses and permits changed. 155 There was no longer any 
reference to "affecting land and water uses in the coastal zone. "156 
Section 314(b)(3) provided that "any applicant for a Federal license 
or permit to conduct any new activity in the coastal zone shall 
provide in the license or permit a certification that the proposed 
activity complies with the state's approved management pro-
gram."157 
There were also several attempts on the Senate floor to extend 
provisions of the CZMA beyond the coastal zone. Senator Hale 
Boggs attempted unsuccessfully to add an amendment which would 
have granted coastal state governors a veto over the issuance of any 
OCS lease which affected the coastal zone. 158 Furthermore, the Sen-
ate added a provision bill requiring the National Academy of Science 
to undertake a full investigation of the hazards of the OCS drilling. 159 
The House also enacted a version of the CZMA in 1972. 160 The 
consistency language for federally conducted or supported activities 
150 S. 582, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
151 [d. 
152 [d. 
153 [d. 
154 S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 314(b)(1) (1972). 
155 [d. § 314(b)(3). 
156 [d. 
157 [d. 
158 Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 452-53; Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 
329 n.14 (1984) (discussing an amendment to CZMA proposed by Senator Boggs). 
159 Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 453. 
160 H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 307(c)(1) (1972). 
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in the coastal zone was the same as the Senate bill. 161 Consequently, 
the functional interrelationship test was applicable. 
The language pertaining to state review of consistency certifica-
tions was different than the Senate version. The House bill stated 
that "any applicant for a required Federal license or permit to con-
duct an activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone" 
shall provide a consistency certification. 162 The House report limited 
this section to activities occurring in the coastal zone. 163 
The House attempted to extend the scope of the CZMA beyond 
the coastal zone. Section 312 of the House bill allowed the coastal 
states to establish estuarine sanctuaries which the Secretary could 
extend onto the OCS.l64 In addition, section 313 allowed the Secre-
tary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Interior, to 
develop a mUlti-purpose management plan for OCS areas adjacent 
to the coastal zone within 12 miles from shore. 165 
The conference committee rejected several of the provisions in the 
House and Senate bills that extended specifically the CZMA beyond 
the coastal zone. First, the provision in the Senate bill to have the 
National Academy of Science study the environmental hazards of 
OCS development was deleted because it was "non-germane" to the 
CZMA.l66 Second, section 312 of the House bill was removed because 
"the need for such a provision appears rather remote."167 Finally, 
section 313 of the House bill was rejected because "the provisions 
related thereto did not prescribe sufficient standards or criteria and 
would create potential conflicts with legislation already in existence 
concerning OCS resources. "168 
Nevertheless, Congress was able to accomplish the goal of these 
deleted sections, which was to harmonize OCS activities with state 
coastal zone management programs, by its substitution of "directly 
affecting" for "in" the coastal zone in section 307(c)(1).169 The sub-
stitution required that Federal activities directly affecting the 
coastal zone be certified as consistent with state coastal zone man-
agement programs. Since nothing in the conference committee re-
161 [d. 
162 [d. § 307(c)(3). 
163 H.R. Rep. No. 1049, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1972). 
164 H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 312 (1972); Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 452. 
165 H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 313 (1972); Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 451-52. 
166 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. at 330 n.14 (quoting the remarks of 
Congressman Downing, 118 Congo Rec. 35547 (1972». 
167 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1972). 
168 [d. at 15. 
169 Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 455. 
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port limited the scope of section 307(c)(1) or contradicted the 1971 
Senate report, one could assume that the functional interrelationship 
test continued to be applied to 307(c)(1). As a result, Federal activ-
ities that had a direct impact on or were functionally related with 
the coastal zone, whether occurring inside or outside the coastal 
zone, were subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1). 
The final language for section 307(c)(3), pertaining to state consis-
tency review of federally issued licenses or permits, followed the 
House version. It stated that "any applicant for a required Federal 
license or permit to conduct an activity affecting land and water uses 
in the coastal zone shall certify that the activity is consistent with 
the state's program."170 The conference committee report, explaining 
the scope of state authority under section 307(c)(3) stated that, 
Federal agencies involved in any activity directly affecting the 
State coastal zone ... must make certain that their activities 
are to the maximum extent practicable consistent with approved 
state management programs. In addition, similar consideration 
of State management programs must be given in the process of 
issuing Federal licenses or permits for activities affecting State 
coastal zones. 171 
Consequently, the functional interrelationship test which underlied 
section 307(c)(1) was also applicable to section 307(c)(3). 
3. 1976 
In 1976, Congress amended the CZMA in order to deal with the 
impacts of OCS energy development. 172 The CZMA amendments 
established the Coastal Energy Impact Program,173 and added sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B).174 Congress designed these new sections to reduce 
coastal state opposition and thus expedite OCS development. 175 
The original version of the House amendments to the CZMA in 
1976 added "lease" to section 307(c)(3).176 The inclusion of leasing 
clarified the scope of section 307(c)(3) and put to rest any doubts 
concerning consistency review of OCS lease sales. The House report 
stated that, "the Committee believes that it would break faith with 
170 S. 3507, 92d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) § 307(c)(3). 
171 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) at 14. 
172 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1982). 
173 [d. § 1456(a). 
174 See supra note 11 for text of section 307(c)(3)(B). 
175 H.R. Rep. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30--31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo 
AND ADMIN. NEWS 1828 [hereinafter Report No. 1298]. 
176 H.R. 3981, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 307(c)(3) (1976). 
1987] EXXON V. FISCHER 579 
the states not to state plainly its clear intent to include major federal 
actions as OCS leasing under the 'federal consistency' section."177 
Leasing, however, was deleted from section 307(c)(3) on the House 
floor. The deletion occurred, not because of opposition to the concept, 
but to give Congress more time to consider the issue during the 
conference committee deliberations. 178 
The Senate bill also added "lease" to section 307(c)(3).179 This 
cleared up any ambiguity concerning the applicability of consistency 
provisions to OCS lease sales. The Senate report stated that, "if the 
activity may affect the State coastal zone and it has an approved 
management program, the consistency requirements do apply. "180 
The conference committee deleted "lease" from section 307(c)(3), 
which was renumbered as section 307(c)(3)(A).181 The committee 
added a new section 307(c)(3)(B) extending the consistency require-
ments to the basic steps in the OCS development process-explo-
ration, development and production. 182 An applicant submitting an 
exploration or development and production plan to Interior was 
required to certify that "any exploration, development and produc-
tion described in such plan and affecting any land use or water use 
in the coastal zone of such state . . . complies with such state's 
approved management program .... "183 The coastal state had to 
approve the plan or no further activity could occur unless the Sec-
retary of Commerce overruled the state's objection.184 
This new section consolidated the approval process for Federal 
licenses and permits. Once Interior and the coastal state approved 
a plan, all required licenses and permits were presumed to be in 
conformity with the state's coastal zone management program. 185 
There was no need for consistency review of individual licenses or 
I77 H.R. Rep. No. 878, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 53 (1976). 
178 Representative DuPont, sponsor of the amendment, stated: 
By striking it in the House bill and leaving it in the bill that has already passed the 
Senate we will be giving ourselves a little bit of flexibility in the conference to either 
adopt the language as the Senate put it or adopt some other language we feel would 
be more beneficial and at the same time protect the rights of the States. 
So the purpose of this amendment is not to get rid of the word 'lease' but to allow 
us time to work on the problem a little bit longer. 
122 CONGo REc. 6128 (1976). 
179 S. 586, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 307(c)(3) (1975). 
180 S. Rep. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975). 
181 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1982). 
182 [d. 
183 [d. § 1456(c)(3)(B). 
184 [d. § 1456(c)(3)(A). 
185 Report No. 1298, supra note 175, at 30-31. 
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permits. This presumption expedited the OCS development pro-
cess. IS6 
Section 307(c)(3)(B) utilized the "affecting land and water uses" 
language which was derived from the 1972 CZMA. Consequently, if 
OCS exploration has a functional interrelationship from an economic, 
social, or geographic standpoint with the coastal zone, such economic 
effects are subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(3)(B). 
4. 1980 
In 1980, Congress reauthorized the CZMA.187 Congress main-
tained the funding for the CZMA because state programs had not 
yet become sufficiently institutionalized. 188 Congress recognized that 
New and expanding demands for food, energy, minerals, defense 
needs, recreation, waste disposal, transportation, and industrial 
activities in the Great Lakes, territorial sea, and oes are placing 
stress on these areas and are creating the need for resolution of 
serious conflicts among important and competing uses and values 
in coastal and ocean waters.189 
Furthermore, Congress required the coastal states to meet new 
national objectives in the development and implementation of their 
coastal zone management programs, such as: 
[P]riority consideration being given to coastal-dependent uses 
and orderly processes for siting major facilities related to na-
tional defense, energy, fisheries development, recreation, ports 
and transportation, and the location, to the maximum extent 
practicable, of new commercial and industrial developments in 
or adjacent to areas where such development already exists. 19o 
Both the House and Senate reports made reference to the consis-
tency provisions. The House concluded that the consistency require-
ments required no change. 191 The only uncertainty was over the 
threshold test for "directly affecting," which would be invoked for 
activities having "a functional interrelationship from an economic, 
186 [d. 
1"7 Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 
(1980). 
188 H.R. Rep. No. 1012, 96th Congo 2d Sess. 33 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4381 [hereinafter Report No. 1012]. 
189 16 U.S.C. § 1451(f) (1982). 
190 [d. § 1452(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
191 Report No. 1012, supra note 188, at 34. 
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geographic or social standpoint with a State coastal program's land 
or water use policies. "192 
The House report specifically recognized that "the acceleration of 
OCS activity will have a profound impact on the coastal zone .... "193 
Consequently, the "rational balancing of competing pressures on 
finite coastal resources which was intended by the 1972 act," and 
the recognition that such balancing would be increasingly difficult in 
the future, warranted the reauthorization of the CZMA.194 
The Senate concurred with the House. The Senate report stated 
that intergovernmental coordination begins as soon as "Interior sets 
in motion a series of events which have consequences in the coastal 
zone" and "must continue during the crucial exploration, develop-
ment, and production stages. "195 
Both the House and Senate reports were concerned with the 
"directly affecting" test of 307(c)(1) which is more rigorous than the 
"affecting land and water uses" test of section 307(c)(3)(B). Since 
Congress recognized that the functional interrelationship test ap-
plied to section 307(c)(1), the test continued to apply to section 
307(c)(3)(B). Consequently, the socioeconomic effects on land and 
water uses in the coastal zone are subject to state consistency review 
under section 307(c)(3)(B). 
B. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
Regulations 
The courts defer generally to agency regulations, if the regulations 
"implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable man-
ner. "196 An examination of NOAA regulations demonstrates that 
socioeconomic impacts constitute effects on land and water use in 
the coastal zone that are subject to consistency review under section 
307(c)(3)(B). 
The first consistency regulations proposed by NOAA in 1976 held 
that the "causal" terms of the Act would be adopted. 197 NOAA made 
no attempt to define the meaning of "directly affecting" or "affecting 
192 [d. 
193 [d. at 33. 
194 [d. 
195 S. Rep. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980). 
196 California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982). 
197 41 Fed. Reg. 42,880 (1976). 
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land and water uses. "198 These terms would speak for themselves 
and NOAA would address any differences on a case by case basis. 199 
In 1977, NOAA issued proposed regulations stating that the "di-
rectly affecting" and "affecting land and water uses" language de-
scribed the impact of an action on the coastal zone which triggered 
federal agency or applicant responsibility to notify the coastal states 
of proposed action. 200 Consistency would be determined later. 201 The 
coastal zone program must delineate any activity that is to be subject 
to consistency review. 202 
The section 307(c)(3)(B) regulation was related to the section 
307(c)(1) regulation. 203 Section 307(c)(1) defined the direct effects "in 
terms of the significance of the effects upon the coastal resources. "204 
Significant effects were "primary, secondary, and cumulative im-
pacts, and actions which may have both beneficial and detrimental 
effects," even if on balance these actions will be beneficial.205 
The "affecting land and water uses" language in section 
307(c)(3)(B) was attributed the same meaning as section 307(c)(1).206 
To distinguish section 307(c)(3)(B) from section 307(c)(1), NOAA 
permitted the states the option of employing a more expansive def-
inition of "significant effect" to include a broad range of resources, 
social and economic effects that the management program consid-
ered to be significant. NOAA noted that a coastal state's broad 
definition of land and water uses would increase the state's ability 
to review proposed applicant activities. 207 Consequently, the scope 
of section 307(c)(3)(B) was broader than section 307(c)(1) and in-
cluded social and economic effects. 
The petroleum industry was critical of the broad authority granted 
to the states. 208 It felt that the states would utilize their authority 
to frustrate OCS development. 209 NOAA, disagreeing, asserted that 
the CZMA presumed a cooperative federal-state effort to develop 
'98ld. 
1991d. 
200 Federal Consistency with Approved Coastal Management Programs, Proposed Policies 
and Procedures, 15 C.F.R. § 930. 
2°'ld. 
2021d. 
203 ld. 
204 ld. 
2051d. 
2061d. at 43,601, 43,604. 
2071d. at 43,601. 
20B ld. at 43,593. 
2091d. 
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OCS resources in a timely manner, while protecting coastal resources 
and industries. 21o NOAA assumed that the state would not abuse 
their consistency authority which was limited by their coastal zone 
programs. 211 Coastal Energy Impact Program funds would encour-
age state cooperation. 212 In addition, the Secretary would oversee 
the state's exercise of state consistency authority. 213 
In the final regulations in 1978, NOAA established a uniform 
standard for all of the consistency provisions of section 307.214 If an 
activity "significantly affected" the coastal zone, the consistency pro-
visions were activated. 215 NOAA noted that although the statutory 
language was not uniform, the legislative history indicated that Con-
gress did not intend to create separate requirements for each sub-
section of 307. The statutory terms were interchangeable. 216 
NOAA intended that the "significantly affecting" language be 
broadly defined.217 Industry commentators recommended that 
NOAA limit the definition to significant effects on "land and water 
uses" in the coastal zone. 218 NOAA rejected this, stating that the 
legislative history was replete with statements indicating that Con-
gress was generally concerned about all federal activities that were 
capable of significantly affecting the coastal zone. 219 Furthermore, 
NOAA's utilization of the "significantly affecting" language, which 
was derived from the proposed 1977 regulations, indicated that so-
cioeconomic impacts were subject to consistency review. 220 
In 1979, the Department of Justice, in the context of a dispute 
over lease sale 48 off California, issued an opinion concerning the 
applicability of section 307(c)(I) to OCS pre-lease activities. 221 Justice 
ruled that OCS pre-lease activities were subject generally to consis-
tency review, if such activities did, in fact, directly affect the coastal 
210 [d. 
211 [d. 
212 [d. 
213 [d. 
214 Federal Consistency with Approved Coastal Management Programs Final Rule, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 10,510 (1978) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930 (1987)). 
215 [d. at 10,511. 
216 [d. 
217 [d. 
218 [d. 
219 [d. 
220 [d. 
221 Whether the pre-leasing activities of the Secretary of the Interior relating to the Outer 
Continental Shelf are subject to the Consisten<:y Requirements of § 307(c)(I) of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act (April 1979) [hereinafter Justice Advisory Opinion]. 
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zone. 222 Furthermore, Justice rejected NOAA's substitution of the 
"significantly affecting" test for all of the threshold tests in section 
307.223 Justice determined that Congress had intended to apply dif-
ferent threshold tests for different activities subject to consistency 
review under section 307. 224 
NOAA revised its regulations in response to Justice's opinion. 
NOAA recognized that even though the legislative history was quite 
general, certain parameters on the threshold tests could be dis-
cerned. 225 The 1972 conference committee report held that once the 
impact threshold was crossed, activities occurring inside and outside 
the coastal zone were subject to consistency review. Other congres-
sional reports required consistency review for activities having "sig-
nificant" effects on coastal resources or a "functional interrelation-
ship from an economic, social, or geographic standpoint with the 
coastal zone. "226 
NOAA decided that the regulations would not define "affecting 
the coastal zone."227 NOAA asserted that Congress granted the af-
fected parties some "discretion to work out the details of their novel 
intergovernmental coordination efforts. "228 Consistency review al-
lowed the coastal states to review and comment upon proposed 
activities, thus assisting the states in planning for and managing the 
impacts of proposed development. 229 Given these benefits, NOAA 
encouraged all of the affected parties "to liberally construe the 
threshold tests in favor of the inclusion of federal activities subject 
to consistency review. "230 
The 1979 revision of the regulations did not limit, but broadened, 
the scope of state consistency authority under section 307(c)(3)(B) 
to effects which significantly affected the coastal zone. Significant 
effects included socioeconomic impacts. Justice implied that this was 
too narrow because Congress intended different threshold determi-
nations. The plain language of section 307(c)(3)(B)-"affecting land 
and water uses"-is broader in scope than "significantly affecting." 
222Id. 
223 Id. 
224Id. 
225 Consistency for Department of the Interior Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Prelease Sale 
Activities, Final Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,142, 37,143 (1979) (codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930). 
226Id. 
227Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
23°Id. 
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Even though the current regulations do not define "the land and 
water uses in the coastal zone,"231 the evolution of the regulations 
demonstrates that the socioeconomic impacts on land and water uses 
in the coastal zone are subject to state consistency review under 
section 307(c)(3)(B). 
C. Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) 
Congress was aware of the adverse impacts of OCS development 
on the coastal zone and the need to provide coastal states with funds 
to deal with such impacts. 232 An initial proposal included a general 
OCS revenue sharing program. 233 Congress did not proceed in this 
direction. Instead, Congress granted coastal states funds through 
the CEIP to study and plan for the impacts, including the socioeco-
nomic effects, of OCS development. 234 
In the Senate version of the 1976 CZMA Amendments, CEIP 
funds were designed to help the coastal states study the impacts of 
OCS development.235 The states were to receive loans from CEIP 
to deal with temporary impacts and grants to deal with long-term 
harm. 236 The Senate report stated that: 
In either case, the impacts in question must be the result of a 
Federal license, lease or permit for exploration, development or 
production of energy resources . . . . The impacts must occur 
within the State's coastal zone, although the activities causing 
the impacts may be outside the coastal zone, on either land or 
water. 237 
231 For some activities covered by these terms see 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.53(b), 930.58(a), 
930.77(b)(3) (1987). 
Examples ofland and water uses and coastal zone activities are stated in 16 U.S.C. § 1451(c) 
and (f) which include industrial and commercial activities, mining, transportation and navi-
gation, waste disposal, and fishing. 
232 H.R. Rep. No. 878, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976). This report contains a statement 
from the National Governors' Conference which reads, 
The Governors believe that any OCS program will have substantial financial impact 
on affected states . . . . Adequate federal funds should be made available now to 
States to enable them to stay ahead of the program and plan for onshore impact. 
Once the program commences provisions should be made for federal assistance such 
as the application of federal royalty revenues to affected coastal and adjacent states 
in compensation for any net adverse budgetary impacts and for the costs of fulfilling 
state responsibilities in the regulation of off and onshore development. 
233 S. Rep. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975) [hereinafter Report No. 277]; H.R. Rep. 
No. 878, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976) [hereinafter Report No. 878]. 
234 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1982). 
235 Report No. 277, supra note 233, at 22. 
236 ld. 
237 ld. 
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The Senate committee was concerned that CEIP expenditures 
would be harmonious with the CZMA. Consequently, the states had 
to demonstrate adverse impacts; be engaged in comprehensive 
coastal zone management; and spend the funds in a manner consis-
tent with the purposes of the CZMA.238 
The House was also aware of the harm that OCS development 
posed to state coastal zones. The House committee noted that disen-
chanted coastal states had threatened law suits and restrictive per-
mitting controls because their views had not been accorded the 
proper weight. 239 Coastal states were not opposed to OCS develop-
ment, but wanted to be involved in the process from the beginning 
and share in the profits of such activity.240 Consequently, the House 
passed the CEIP in order to decrease state hostility and thus ex-
pedite OCS development.241 
The CEIP was included in the CZMA Amendments of 1976.242 The 
CEIP provided coastal states with funds "for study of and planning 
for, consequences relating to new or expanded energy facilities in, 
or which significantly affect, the coastal zone. "243 Such consequences 
were "any economic, coastal, or environmental consequence which 
has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur in the coastal zone 
from the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of new or 
expanded facilities. "244 This demonstrated congressional concern 
with the socioeconomic impacts of OCS development. 
NOAA regulations manifested a similar concern. The regulations 
defined "significantly affecting" as "likely to cause population 
changes in the coastal zone" or "likely to change employment pat-
terns in the coastal zone, including fishing and tourism."245 Since 
population and economic changes generated by OCS development 
triggered CEIP grants, clearly NOAA assumed that policies con-
cerning social and economic impacts were within the scope of the 
CZMA. 
The CEIP also provided the funding to comply with section 
305(b)(8) of CZMA which requires state coastal zone management 
238 [d. at 33. 
239 Report No. 878, supra note 233, at 28-29. 
240 [d. 
241 [d. 
242 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1982). 
243 [d. § 1456a(a)(I)(B). 
244 H.R. REP. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Report 
No. 1298]. 
245 15 C.F.R. § 931.114 (1987). 
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programs to include policies to anticipate and manage the impacts 
of energy projects that significantly affect the coastal zone.246 The 
legislative history of section 305(b )(8) demonstrated congressional 
concern with the socioeconomic impacts of energy facilities that sig-
nificantly affect the coastal zone. 
The Senate report required a planning process for energy facilities 
in the coastal zone which affect the coastal zone.247 The House report 
restricted the planning process to energy facilities in the coastal 
zone, but socioeconomic and environmental impacts were to be con-
sidered. 248 The conference committee compromise provided for "a 
planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in, or which 
may significantly affect the coastal zone, including impact manage-
ment. "249 Impact management included the socioeconomic and envi-
ronmental impacts specified in the House bill.250 Since OCS devel-
opment significantly affects the coastal zone, the states are required 
to provide a planning process in their coastal zone management 
programs that considers the socioeconomic impacts of OCS devel-
opment.251 
The purpose of the CEIP was to improve coastal zone management 
planning by providing funds to the states to develop policies that 
were harmonious with the CZMA. These include land and water use 
policies to anticipate and manage social and economic impacts of OCS 
development. Since Congress would grant CEIP funds only to fur-
ther CZMA policies, provisions in the state's coastal zone manage-
ment program that provide for the management of social and eco-
nomic impacts are by definition within the scope of the CZMA. 
Consequently, the coastal states can base their consistency objec-
tions on the socioeconomic impacts of OCS development on land and 
water uses in the coastal zone. 
D. Court Decisions 
Several courts have addressed a similar issue in a different con-
text, whether socioeconomic impacts of OCS lease sales directly 
246 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(8) (1982) which requires coastal zone management programs to 
include, "A planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in, or which may signif-
icantly affect, the coastal zone, including, but not limited to, a process for anticipating and 
managing the impacts from such facilities." 
247 Report No. 277, supra note 233, at 33. 
248 Report No. 878, supra note 233, at 45-46. 
249 Report No. 1298, supra note 244 at 29. 
250 [d. 
251 [d. 
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affect the coastal zone under section 307(c)(1).252 In 1981, a federal 
district court in California held that OCS lease sales directly affected 
the coastal zone, thus were subject to consistency review under 
section 307(c)(1).253 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this 
decision. 254 Both courts recognized the socioeconomic effects of OCS 
leasing on the coastal zone. 
Following these cases, a federal district court in New Jersey 
determined that the socioeconomic impacts of OCS leasing alone did 
not constitute direct effects under section 307(c)(1).255 A federal 
district court in Massachusetts, disagreeing with the New Jersey 
court, held that socioeconomic impacts were direct effects on the 
coastal zone subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(l).256 
The Supreme Court put the issue to rest with its narrow inter-
pretation of "directly affecting" in Secretary of Interior v. Califor-
nia.257 The Court held that OCS lease sales did not directly affect 
the coastal zone under section 307(c)(1) and thus federal consistency 
certification was not necessary. 258 
The Supreme Court was concerned with whether OCS leasing was 
subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1).259 The Court 
did not examine the scope of state consistency authority under sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B). The Court did, however, note that the state pos-
sessed broad authority at the later stages of the OCS development 
process. 260 Consequently, socioeconomic impacts on land and water 
uses in the coastal zone remained subject to state consistency review 
under section 307(c)(3)(B). 
1. Kean v. Watt 
New Jersey, in its suit opposing an offer by the United States to 
lease tracts of the OCS area off its coast, alleged that the socioeco-
252 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) states that "[elach Federal agency conducting or supporting activ-
ities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in such a 
manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state -man-
agement programs." 
253 State v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
254 California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). 
255 Kean v. Watt, No. 82-2420 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 1982), vacated as moot, No. 82-5679 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
256 Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1983), aII'd on other 
grounds, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
257 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
258 [d. 
259 [d. 
260 [d. 
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nomic effects on the fishing industry resulting from OCS develop-
ment of the tracts directly affected the coastal zone and thus required 
a consistency determination by Interior.261 New Jersey argued that 
the harm to the nonmigratory tilefish which live exclusively on the 
OCS and to other fish and crustaceans which live in the same area 
would significantly affect commercial and recreational fishing. 262 New 
Jersey requested that Interior delete some tracts, and impose a 
biological resource stipulation on other tracts. 263 
Interior alleged that none of the possible effects of the OCS lease 
sales directly affected the coastal zone. 264 Furthermore, federal OCS 
activities that only have socioeconomic impacts on the coastal zone 
were not subject to consistency review. 265 Section 307(c)(1) limited 
consistency review to federal activities having a direct physical im-
pact on the natural resources of the coastal zone. 266 
The federal district court held that the proposed lease sale, not 
its socioeconomic impacts, was subject to consistency review under 
section 307(c)(1).267 State coastal zone management authority did not 
extend to activities occurring on the OCS.268 The CZMA protected 
only the physical resources of the coastal zone, not the economic 
health of coastal industries. 269 Adverse economic impacts on coastal 
industries were not subject to consistency review unless the effects 
arose from an interference with the natural resources of the coastal 
zone.270 If the court accepted New Jersey's arguments, all federal 
activities would be subject to consistency review. 271 
2. Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt 
Lease sale 52 involved the sale of tracts on Georges Bank, one of 
the world's richest fishing grounds. 272 Massachusetts requested the 
deletion of 98 of the 540 proposed tracts, the extension of the Bio-
261 See Kean v. Watt, No. 82-2420 at 15. 
262 [d. at 13-14. 
263 [d. at 13. 
264 [d. at 10. 
265 Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 21-32, Kean v. Watt, No. 82-2420. 
266 [d. 
267 See Kean v. Watt, No. 82-2420, at 37-44. 
268 See id. at 40-41. 
269 [d. 
270 [d. 
271 [d. at 42. 
272 Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd on other 
grounds, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
590 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:561 
logical Task Force to all of Georges Bank,273 and a stipulation that 
notified fishing vessels of the location of pipelines. 274 When the Final 
Notice of Sale was released, Interior had deleted 41 of the requested 
98 tracts, extended the scope of the Biological Task Force, but did 
not include the requested stipulation. 275 Massachusetts brought suit 
challenging the sale on various grounds. 276 
Massachusetts alleged that lease sale 52 was not consistent to the 
maximum extent practicable with the Massachusetts coastal zone 
management program.277 The 98 tracts had to be deleted because an 
oil spill on these tracts would endanger the fishing industry. Mas-
sachusetts asserted that the socioeconomic impacts on the coastal 
fishing industry constituted a direct effect under section 307(c)(1).278 
Furthermore, Interior's consistency determination was deficient be-
cause it did not articulate adequately why lease sale 52 was consis-
tent with the Massachusetts coastal zone management program. 279 
Interior asserted that Massachusetts' definition of "directly af-
fecting" was contrary to the Kean decision.280 Socioeconomic impacts 
were not subject to consistency review which was only required for 
activities having a direct physical impact on the natural resources of 
the coastal zone. 281 Furthermore, the consistency determination sub-
mitted by Interior demonstrated consistency to the maximum extent 
practicable with the Massachusetts coastal zone management pro-
gram. 282 
The Court, disagreeing with the Kean decision, found that lease 
sale 52 did directly affect the coastal zone.283 The Court determined 
that the CZMA was concerned with socioeconomic development. 284 
The legislative history of the CZMA supported a broad definition of 
273 The Georges Bank Biological Task Force was established as a result of the Interior-
NOAA compromise which resulted in the withdrawal of Georges Bank from consideration as 
a marine sanctuary. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,553 (1979). 
274 Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. at 576. 
275Id. 
276Id. at 566-67, 574-78. 
277Id. at 574. 
278 See id. at 574-75. 
279 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction at 29-40, Commonwealth v. Watt, No. 83-0530 (D. Mass. March n, 1983). 
280 Memorandum in Opposition to Motions for Preliminary Injunction Preventing OCS Lease 
Sale 52 at 44-48, Commonwealth v. Watt, No. 83-0530 (D. Mass. March 11,1983); Conservation 
Law Found. v. Watt, No. 83-0506 (D. Mass. March 18, 1983). 
281Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Conservation Law Found., 560 F. Supp. at 575. 
284 Id. 
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directly affecting that included socioeconomic impacts.285 In addition, 
the Court held that Interior's consistency determination was inade-
quate because Interior had not explained sufficiently why lease sale 
52 was consistent with the Massachusetts coastal zone management 
program. 286 
3. State of California v. Watt 
In this case the courts dealt with the issue of whether OCS lease 
sales directly affected the coastal zone under section 307(c)(1). The 
federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court determined that 
lease sale 53, off the coast of California, directly affected the coastal 
zone and was thus subject to consistency review under section 
307(c)(1).287 Both courts accepted that socioeconomic impacts of OCS 
leasing constituted direct effects on the coastal zone.288 The Supreme 
Court, however, held that OCS lease sales did not directly affect the 
coastal zone,289 and thus were not subject to consistency review 
under section 307(c)(1).290 
The federal district court found that OCS lease sales directly 
affected the state's coastal zone. 291 Among the direct effects were 
socioeconomic impacts. 292 The district court stated that the Secre-
tarial Issues Document and the Environmental Impact Statement 
list a multitude of "impacts arising out of operations in the leasing 
area such as impacts upon air and water quality, marine and coastal 
ecosystems, commercial fisheries ... , and socio-economic fac-
tors. "293 The Ninth Circuit Court, upholding the district court's de-
cision, stated that the "direct effects ... on California's coastal zone 
are detailed by the district court. "294 
285 Judge Mazzone stated that the CZMA "recognizes that a wide range of uses and concerns 
comes within the purview of the Act," such as "ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic 
values as well as ... economic development." Judge Mazzone noted that in the legislative 
history "example after example of socioeconomic effects of oil and gas exploration were 
discussed, evidencing a clear Congressional intent to lessen such impacts through coordinated 
planning between states and the Federal government." [d. 
286 See id. at 578. 
287 State v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981); California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
286 520 F. Supp. at 1380; 683 F.2d at 1260. 
289 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 315 (1984). 
280 [d. at 343. 
291 520 F. Supp. at 1380. 
292 See id. at 1380-81. 
293 [d. at 1381. 
294 California v. Watt, 683 F.2d at 1260. 
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The Supreme Court, however, held that OCS lease sales did not 
directly affect state coastal zones. 295 The Court determined that the 
legislative history indicated that section 307(c)(1) was limited to the 
geographical confines of the coastal zone. 296 Furthermore, the careful 
separation of OCS leasing from subsequent exploration in the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act demonstrated that OCS leasing did not 
directly affect the coastal zone.297 The lease sale had no physical 
impacts on the coastal zone. 298 It only granted the lessee priority 
position in the submission of subsequent exploration, development 
and production plans. 299 
The Court's decision was incorrect. The decision was contrary to 
legislative history, NOAA regulations, and the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act. 300 The Court did not adopt the causal meaning of 
"directly affecting." The Court limited the direct effects of federally 
conducted or supported activity to the geographical confines of the 
coastal zone. 301 The "affecting" language in 307(c)(3)(B), however, 
describes the causal relationship between federally permitted activ-
ity and land and water uses in the coastal zone, not the geographical 
location of the activity.302 Consequently, the Court's reasoning cannot 
be applied to limit state consistency authority under section 
307(c)(3)(B).303 
Furthermore, the Court only determined that a particular activity, 
OCS leasing, was not subject to consistency review under section 
307(c)(1). It did not address specifically the issue of the scope of 
state consistency authority. The Court did, however, remark that, 
"[s]tates with approved CZMA plans retain considerable authority 
to veto inconsistent exploration or development and production plans 
put forward in those later stages. "304 
IV. ISSUE 2: SECRETARIAL OVERRIDE 
The second major issue in Exxon Corp. v. Fischer was procedural, 
addressing the Secretary of Commerce's role regarding the override 
295 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1983). 
296Id. at 321-25. 
297 I d. at 335-44. 
298 See id. at 338-39. 
299 I d. at 339. 
300 Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 45l. 
301 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. at 321-35. 
302 Eichenberg & Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal Zone Management 
and "New Federalism" 14 Ecology L.Q. 9, 25-30 (1987). 
303 Id. 
304 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 341 (1983). 
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of state objections under section 307(c)(3)(B).305 The issue posed two 
questions. First, was a decision on appeal from the Secretary a 
prerequisite for judicial review of the Commission's objection?306 The 
district court held that since the Secretary could not address the 
substantive issue-whether socioeconomic impacts on land and water 
uses in the coastal zone resulting from OCS exploration were subject 
to state consistency review-an appeal to the Secretary was not 
necessary.307 The Ninth Circuit did not answer the question. 308 An 
appeal to the Secretary was required in this case. The appeal process 
is inherent in the structure of the consistency provisions and re-
quired by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 309 
The second question was whether the Secretary, in his consider-
ation of Exxon's appeal, decided the substantive issue in the case. 310 
The district court held that he did not,311 but the Ninth Circuit Court 
determined that he had. 312 The Secretary decided the substantive 
issue in his consideration of adverse impacts and reasonable alter-
natives. 313 Consequently, subsequent judicial review of the issue was 
barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Kenneth Culp Davis points out that the doctrine of administrative 
remedies involves judicial discretion because of its inherent ten-
sions. 314 Invocation of the doctrine is encouraged when there are 
such factors, 
as need for factual development, importance of reflecting agen-
cy's expertise or policy preferences in the final result, probability 
that the agency will satisfactorily resolve the controversy with-
out judicial review, protection of agency processes from impair-
ment by avoidable interruption, conservation of judicial energy 
by avoiding piecemeal or interlocutory review, and providing the 
agency opportunity to correct its own errors. 315 
305 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 20-24. 
306 Id. 
307 I d. at 22. 
308 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 1987). 
309 See Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 20-24. 
310 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d at 846. 
311 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 28-29. 
312 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d at 846. 
313 Id. 
314 See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1984). 
315 Id. § 26.1, at 415. 
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Resort to the doctrine is discouraged when there are such factors, 
as irreparable injury to a party from pursuing the administrative 
remedy, clear absence of agency jurisdiction, clear illegality of 
the agency's position, a dispositive question of law peculiarly 
within judicial competence, the futility of exhaustion, and ex-
pense and awkwardness of the administrative proceeding as com-
pared within expensive and efficient judicial disposition of the 
controversy. 316 
The district court held that the doctrine did not apply in this case 
because the Secretary could not reach the issue of coastal zone 
effects.317 Once the California Commission objected to Exxon's ex-
ploration plan, all that remained was a legal question. At that point, 
Exxon had the right to challenge the Commission's exercise of its 
consistency authority. 318 
The district court was incorrect. The doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies applied in this case for several reasons. 
First, Congress designed the appeals process to carry out the 
purposes of CZMA. Congress set out certain goals and allocated 
power to realize these goals. Section 307(c)(3)(B) granted coastal 
states the right to determine if a lessee's exploration, development 
and production plans were consistent with a state's coastal zone 
management program. Only the Secretary could override the state's 
objection. Since the statute defined this process as the means to 
realize the goals of the CZMA, premature judicial review would 
interfere with the intent of Congress. 
Second, a decision by the Secretary could resolve the conflict 
without the need for judicial review. Under NOAA regulations, 
California's objection was presumed to be correct. The Secretary 
could only override the objection if he found the activity to be in 
conformity with the CZMA or necessary for national security.319 
NOAA deliberately kept the Secretary's override authority narrow. 
In the first proposed regulations in 1977, Congress defined the 
Secretary's override authority narrowly.320 The Secretary could only 
override a state's objection if he found the activity was in conformity 
with the CZMA or in the interest of national security.321 Otherwise, 
316Id. at 414-15. 
317 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362, at 26-29. 
318Id. 
31. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.121, 930.122 (1987). 
320 42 Fed. Reg. 43,594-95 (1977). 
321Id. 
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the state's objection prevailed. 322 Under the proposed regulations, 
the Office of Coastal Zone Management in NOAA would review a 
state's implementation of its coastal zone management program, 
including consistency determinations. 323 
There was much criticism concerning the Secretary's override 
authority in the proposed regulations. 324 The oil and gas industry 
complained that the Secretary's authority was too narrow and did 
not provide sufficient discretion. 325 The coastal states argued that 
the Secretary's override authority was too broad. 326 
In the final regulations issued in 1978, NOAA refused to change 
its position. 327 The correctness of a state's consistency objection could 
not be the basis of the Secretary's override.328 The Secretary was 
not empowered to determine if a coastal state correctly determined 
that an activity was consistent with its coastal zone management 
program. 329 The correctness of the state's decision was assumed. 330 
Congress intended the Secretary's case by case determination for 
the review of inconsistent actions that warranted federal approval 
based on overriding national concern. 331 Challengers could bring any 
other objections to the Office of Coastal Zone Management or to the 
courtS. 332 The Secretary could only "provide a variance when justified 
by overriding national concerns. "333 
Once the Commission objected, Exxon was required to appeal to 
the Secretary of Commerce. Exxon could only judicially challenge 
the Commission's decision at this point if the secretarial appellate 
process would not address the basis of the challenge. 334 The Secre-
tary addressed the issue raised by Exxon's objection, however, in 
his consideration of adverse impacts and reasonable alternatives. 
Consequently, judicial review of the Commission's decision should 
not have occurred until after the Secretary's decision. Furthermore, 
Exxon should not have brought suit against the Commission, but 
against the Secretary. 
322Id. 
323 Id. 
324 43 Fed. Reg. 10,516 (1978). 
325Id. 
326 Id. 
327Id. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. 
33°Id. 
331Id. 
332Id. 
333 42 Fed. Reg. 43,594-95 (1977). 
334 43 Fed. Reg. 10,516 (1978). 
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Third, the postponement of judicial review would prevent the 
fragmentation and maintain the integrity of the appellate process. 335 
This would reinforce state authority which was part of the induce-
ment to encourage coastal states to participate in the coastal zone 
management program. 336 
Finally, delaying judicial review until after the Secretary's deci-
sion would preserve judicial resources. A judicial challenge of the 
state's objection at this intermediate point in an ongoing administra-
tive process would not preclude another judicial challenge of the 
Secretary's decision on appeal. 
The courts should have held that judicial review of the Commis-
sion's objection must await the Secretary's decision on appeal. The 
Secretary would address the substantive issue presented. Further-
more, the Commission's objection was an intermediate step in an 
ongoing process. The final step, as defined by Congress, was appeal 
to the Secretary. To allow premature judicial review would frustrate 
the congressional scheme which was designed to establish a federal-
state partnership. 337 
B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
Since the Secretary addressed the substantive question on appeal, 
Exxon was precluded from challenging the Commission's decision 
under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The doc-
trine of res judicata holds that "a final judgment on the merits bars 
further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause 
of action."338 Under the principle of collateral estoppel once an issue 
is actually litigated and necessarily determined, that determination 
is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action 
but involving a party or privy to the prior litigation. 339 The principles 
underlying these doctrines are, 
that a party who once had a chance to litigate a claim before an 
appropriate tribunal usually ought not to have another chance 
to do so. A related but narrower principle-that one who has 
actually litigated an issue should not be allowed to relitigate it-
underlies the rule of issue preclusion. 340 
88& See generally Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 24. 
886 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982). 
337 For another application of this reasoning see Judge Conti's decision in Exxon Corp. v. 
Fischer, No. C-83-39U-SC, slip op. at 8-12 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 1984). 
388 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1978). 
339 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1978). 
340 DAVIS, supra note 314 § 21.1 at 48. 
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Both of these doctrines apply to the administrative forum. The 
Supreme Court has stated that, 
When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity 
and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it, which the 
parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts 
have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce [the deci-
sion]. 341 
The district court determined that neither doctrine applied to the 
Secretary's decision in this case. 342 The Secretary was not acting in 
a judicial capacity.343 The Secretary did not examine the statutory 
language or legislative history of the CZMA, thus he did not address 
the issue before the court.344 
The Ninth Circuit Court, overturning the district court decision, 
found that the Secretary was acting in a judicial capacity.345 Exxon 
was given a full opportunity to submit evidence and participate in 
the decision. 346 The Secretary addressed the substantive issue in the 
case. The Secretary considered the effects on land and water uses 
in the coastal zone of Exxon's exploration and determined them not 
to be substantial. 347 Nevertheless, restricting Exxon's exploration 
activities to the prescribed drilling window could preclude any ad-
verse impacts. 348 The Secretary's costlbenefit analysis was crucial to 
his decision. 349 If the Secretary did not consider socioeconomic im-
pacts, there was nothing to which Exxon's interests could be sub-
ordinated. 
The Ninth Circuit Court was correct in its determination that the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel applied in this case. 
Kenneth Culp Davis points out that the invocation of the doctrines 
concerning administrative decisions depends on the same factors as 
in the courts, such as "identity of claims and issues, identity of 
parties, final decisions on the merits, collateral attack, [and] juris-
diction."35o Res judicata is applicable particularly when the admin-
341Id. (quoting United States v. Utah Construction Co., 384 U.S. 394,421-22 (1966)). 
342Id. at 26-28. 
343 I d. at 28. 
344 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362 at 29. 
345 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d at 846. 
346 See id. at 844-85. 
347 I d. at 846. 
3481d. 
349 Id. 
350 DAVIS, supra note 178, § 21.2, at 50. 
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istrative agency acts in the same manner as a court.351 Such similar-
ity extends both to questions of fact and law. 352 
Following Exxon's original appeal in this issue, a public hearing 
took place in Santa Barbara on November 8, 1983. Various federal 
agencies and the parties involved provided extensive commentary. 
On March 9, 1984, Exxon filed its appeal with the Secretary. 353 
Commerce published a public notice of the appeal in the Federal 
Register354 and in a local Santa Barbara newspaper. The Secretary 
considered all of the comments received in the past and present 
appeal in his analysis of the legal and factual issues presented.355 
All of the requirements identified by Davis were present in the 
Secretary's decision. In the decision were identity of the issues and 
parties, a final decision on the merits by the Secretary, and the 
possibility of collateral attack on the courts of the Secretary's deci-
sion. Furthermore, the Secretary clearly had jurisdiction over the 
issue. Since the Secretary considered the socioeconomic impacts on 
land and water uses in the coastal zone resulting from Exxon's 
exploration, a fact Exxon admitted,356 Exxon was precluded from 
challenging the Commission's objection under the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. 
Exxon's proper recourse would have been to challenge the Sec-
retary's decision under section 706 of the Administrative Procedures 
Act.357 In such a case, the court would have to review the Secretary's 
decision to determine if it was arbitrary, not in accordance with the 
law, contrary to constitutional limits, in excess of his jurisdiction, 
procedurally incorrect, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 358 
351 See id. 
352 See id. § 21.2, at 49. 
353 49 Fed. Reg. 11,699 (1984). 
354 Id. 
355 Secretary's Findings, supra note 85. 
356 On Appeal from a Final Judgment of the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California at 42-44, Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-
6572). 
357 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). 
358 Section 706 empowers reviewing courts to hold: 
... unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
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V. CONCLUSION 
OCS development has generated an ongoing conflict between the 
federal and state governments known as the Seaweed Rebellion. The 
extent of coastal state authority over OCS development under the 
consistency provisions of the CZMA has been the focus of several 
federal-state court battles in the rebellion. In Secretary of Interior 
v. California, the Supreme Court held that OCS lease sales did not 
directly affect the coastal zone,359 and thus federal consistency cer-
tification was not required under section 307(c)(1).360 In Exxon v. 
Fischer, the scope of state consistency authority under section 
307(c)(3)(B) was contested. 361 The courts faced two questions. First, 
were the effects on the land and water uses in the coastal zone 
resulting from Exxon's interference with thresher shark fishing on 
the OCS subject to state consistency review under section 
307(c)(3)(B)? Second, what was the Secretary of Commerce's role 
regarding the override of state objections? 
The socioeconomic impacts on California's coastal fishing industry 
resulting from Exxon's interference with thresher shark fishing con-
stituted effects on land and water uses in the coastal zone that were 
subject to state consistency review. This was demonstrated in the 
legislative history, NOAA regulations, Coastal Energy Impact Pro-
gram, and planning requirements of section 305(b)(8) of the CZMA. 
Furthermore, several federal district courts determined that the 
socioeconomic impacts of OCS lease sales were direct effects on the 
coastal zone that were subject to consistency review under section 
307(c)(1).362 Even though the Supreme Court held that OCS lease 
sales did not directly affect the coastal zone, the Court's decision did 
not affect the scope of state consistency authority under section 
307(c)(3)(B). In fact, the Court recognized that coastal states could 
"veto inconsistent exploration or development and production plans 
put forward in those latter stages. "363 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to [5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57]; 
... or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo 
by the reviewing court. 
359 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1983). 
360 I d. at 343. 
361 Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, No. 84-2362; Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
362 See e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1983), a/I'd on 
other grounds, 716 F.2d 946 (lst Cir. 1983); State v. Watt, 520 F.2d 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
363 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. at 341. 
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Section 307(c)(3)(B) establishes a process by which the Secretary 
of Commerce can override a state's objection if he finds that the 
activity is consistent with the purposes of the CZMA or in the 
interest of national security. The structure and purposes of the 
CZMA indicate that Congress intended the appeal to the Secretary 
to be an important component in the operation of the consistency 
provisions. 364 In most instances, appeal to the Secretary should be a 
prerequisite to a judicial challenge. An unsuccessful applicant can 
only bypass the appeals process if the Secretary will not address the 
basis of the appeal. This reasoning comports with the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies and NOAA regulations. 
Exxon was required to appeal California's objection to the Sec-
retary because Congress had empowered the Secretary to resolve 
the issue. The Secretary's consideration of socioeconomic impacts in 
his evaluation of adverse impacts and reasonable alternatives pre-
cluded further judicial review of the Commission's decision under 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Exxon's proper 
recourse was to challenge the Secretary's decision. 
The CZMA is designed to generate communication, cooperation, 
coordination, and consultation between the federal and state gov-
ernments. Any attempt to diminish state consistency authority will 
incite further battles in the Seaweed Rebellion which will frustrate 
OCS development. To establish the effective federal-state partner-
ship envisioned by the CZMA, it is necessary to enhance, not dimin-
ish, state consistency authority. 
364 For an excellent overview of the Secretary's role in the consistency process see Eichen-
berg and Archer, supra note 302. 
